Although the existing literature in economics and marketing offers growing evidence on the use of price points, there is a lack of direct evidence on the link between price points and price rigidity. We examine this issue in the retail setting using two datasets. One is a large weekly transaction price dataset, covering 29 product categories over an eight-year period from a large US supermarket chain. The other is from the Internet, and includes daily prices over a two-year period for hundreds of consumer electronic products with a wide range of prices. Across the two datasets, we find that 9 is the most frequently used price-ending for the penny, dime, dollar and the ten-dollar digits. Exploring the relationship between price points and price rigidity in these datasets, we find that the most common price changes are in multiples of dimes, dollars, and tendollar increments. When we econometrically estimate the probability of a price change, we find that 9-ending prices are at least 24 percent (and as much as 73 percent) less likely to change in comparison to prices ending with other digits. We also find that the average size of change of 9-ending prices are systematically larger when they do change, in comparison to non 9-ending prices. This link between price points and price rigidity is remarkably robust across the wide variety of price levels, product categories, and retailers examined in this study. To make sense of these findings, we offer a behavioral explanation building on the emerging literature on rational inattention. We argue that consumers may find it rational to be inattentive to the rightmost digits of retail prices because of the costs of processing price information. In response, firms may find it profitable to set the rightmost digits at 9, and therefore, be rigid in their pricing around these price points. We conclude that price points are a significant source of retail price rigidity in our datasets, and that rational inattention can offer a plausible explanation for their presence.
I. Introduction
The recent expansion in the popularity of new Keynesian ideas has led a growing number of economists to recognize the importance of understanding the sources of nominal price rigidity. 1 One of the recent additions to the list of existing theories of price rigidity is price point theory, which Blinder, et al. (1998) list among the leading twelve-theories of price rigidity.
According to Blinder, et al. (1998, p. 26) , practitioners' "…belief in pricing points is part of the folklore of pricing…" Consistent with this observation, they offer evidence from interviews on the importance of price points. For example, in their study of 200 large U.S. firms, they find that 88% of the firms that operate in the retail industry report substantial importance of psychological price points in their pricing decisions. 2 Similarly, Kashyap (1995) observes that mail-order catalog prices have the tendency to be "stuck" at certain ending prices. He concludes that the existing theories of price rigidity are unable to explain the specific form of price rigidity he finds.
As an alternative explanation he offers the idea of price points, which was suggested by the pricing managers of the mail order companies.
As Blinder et al. (1998, pp. 25−26) note, however, a major difficulty with price point theory is that not much is known about the actual practical importance of price points and their relationship to price rigidity. Price points, although of interest by themselves (e.g., Landsburg, 1995) , will be particularly important for macroeconomics if they can be shown to contribute to price rigidity, across a wide selection of products and retailers. Although the existing literature in economics and marketing offers growing evidence on the use of price points (Friedman, 1967; Schindler and Kirby, 1997; Anderson and Simester, 2003; Schindler and Bizer, 2005) , there is a 1 See, for example, Blinder, et al. (1998) , Caplin (1993) , Warner and Barsky (1995) , Lach and Tsiddon (1996) , Slade (1998) , Ball and Romer (1990, 2003) , Golosov and Lucas (2003) , Davis and Hamilton (2004) , Basu (2005) , Dotsey and King (2005) , Rotemberg (1987 Rotemberg ( , 2005 , and the studies cited therein. For recent surveys of this literature, see Kackmeister (2002) , Willis (2003) , and Wolman (2006) . 2 See also the survey studies of the European Central Bank's Inflation Persistence Network (IPN), including Álvarez and Hernando (2004) , Aucremanne and Dhyne (2005) , Baumgartner, et al. (2005) , and Lünnemann and Mathä (2005) . These are summarized in Fabiani, et al. (2004) . lack of direct evidence on the link between price points and price rigidity. Indeed, the literature documenting a link between price points and price rigidity using the US data is limited to Blinder, et al.'s (1998) interview study and Kashyap's (1995) study of catalogue prices.
We fill this gap in the literature by examining the relationship between price points and price rigidity in the retail setting using two large datasets. One is a large weekly price dataset, covering 29 product categories over an eight-year period from a major Midwestern U.S.
supermarket chain that includes actual transaction prices, as recorded by the stores' cash register scanners. The second dataset comes from the Internet and includes daily prices over a two-year period for hundreds of consumer electronic goods with a wide range of prices, such as music CDs, digital cameras, DVD players, notebook PCs, etc., from 293 different e-retailers. Taken together, the two datasets cover a diverse set of products, a wide range of prices, different retail formats, retailers and time periods. We find that across the two datasets, 9 is the most popular price point for the penny, dime, dollar and the ten-dollar digits.
To explore the link between price points and price rigidity in the two datasets, we begin by examining the patterns of price changes. We find that the most common price changes are in multiples of dimes, dollars, and ten-dollar increments-an outcome that is consistent with efforts to keep the terminal digits at 9. Given the particular significance of 9-ending prices in our data, we econometrically estimate the probability of a price change and find that 9-ending prices are at least 24 percent (and as much as 73 percent) less likely to change in comparison to prices ending with other digits. We also find that the average size of change of 9-ending prices are systematically larger when they do change, in comparison to non 9-ending prices. These findings further underscore the extent of the retail price rigidity that is created by 9-ending price points.
To make sense of these findings, we offer a behavioral explanation building on the emerging literature on rational inattention. We suggest that 9-ending prices can be the outcome of firms' optimal reaction to consumers' rational inattention. Consumers may find it rational to be inattentive to the rightmost digits of retail prices because they face large amounts of information which are costly to gather and process, and have time, and information processing capacity constraints. In response to this inattentiveness, firms may find it profitable to set those digits to the highest possible number, 9. This seems to capture the ideas proposed by Kashyap (1995) and Konieczny (2003) , and offers a plausible resolution to the puzzle posed by Landsburg (1995) . Our findings, thus, suggest that price points are a substantial source of retail price rigidity in the datasets we study, and that rational inattention might offer a plausible behavioral explanation for the use of price points and their link to price rigidity. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the two datasets in section II.
In section III, we document the popularity of 9-endings by assessing the frequency distribution of price-endings in the two datasets. In section IV, we examine the frequency distribution of price changes by size and assess the extent to which they preserve the 9-endings. In section V, we estimate econometrically the effect of 9-endings on the retail price rigidity. In section VI, we study the link between price points and the size of price changes. In section VII, we offer a rational inattention explanation for the 9-ending pricing and price rigidity patterns we find. We conclude in Section 7 by summarizing the findings and discussing their potential implications. Blinder et al. (1998, p. 177) suggest that the most obvious prediction of Kashyap's (1995) price point theory is that price points should be most important to firms in retailing, and more generally, to firms that sell mostly to consumers rather than to other businesses. Following this line of thought, we examine two different retail price datasets. One is Dominick's weekly transaction price data for 29 product categories over an eight-year period. The other contains daily prices from the Internet on hundreds of products varying from music CDs, to DVDs, to hard disks, to notebook PCs. The two datasets cover a variety of products, a wide price range, and different retail formats. In addition, although Dominick's is a retail grocery chain where prices are mostly set on a chain-wide basis at the corporate headquarters, our Internet data come from 293 different retailers presumably employing different pricing-decision models. Thus, our use of two datasets allows us to draw general conclusions that are not specific to a retail format, retailer, product, or price range.
II. Two Datasets
Dominick's Finer Food (DFF) is one of the largest retail supermarket chains in the Chicago metropolitan area, operating about 100 stores with a market share of about 25%. The pricing practices of Dominick's are similar to those employed by large U.S. retail supermarket chains. The chain we study is representative of a major class of the retail grocery trade. The data consist of up to 400 weekly observations of retail prices in 29 different product categories, covering the period from September 14, 1989 to May 8, 1997. In Table 1 , we provide descriptive statistics for weekly retail price observations by each product category contained in this dataset. The retail prices are the actual transaction prices, i.e., the price customers paid at the cash register each week as recorded by the chain's scanners. If an item was on sale, then the price data we have reflect the sale price. Also, the retail prices reflect retailer's coupons or discounts, but not manufacturers' coupons. In the analysis described below, we have used all the data available from all stores, yielding a total of over 98 million weekly price observations. Dominick's data also contains a binary variable indicating whether a given product on a given week was on sale or on promotion. We use a probabilistic model that incorporates this information to estimate a model which accounts for the effect of sales on the likelihood of a price change. See Chevalier et al. (2003) for more details about Dominick's data.
The Internet data were obtained through the use of a price information gathering agent. It was programmed to systematically mine price data from www.BizRate.com, a popular price comparison site, and ran daily from 3:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. From a list of products available at
BizRate.com, we generated a large sample of product IDs using stratified proportionate random sampling (Wooldridge, 2002 
III. Evidence on the Popularity of 9-Ending Prices
We begin by presenting results on the frequency distribution of price-endings in the two datasets. In the analysis of Dominick's data, our focus is on 9¢ and 99¢ price-endings because 3 Sometimes the Internet-based sellers' (especially small firms') web sites were inaccessible or the required price information was not available. Some prices, therefore, are missing in our original dataset. We used the following procedure to handle such missing data. If 10% or more observations were missing for a product in a store, then that series was excluded from the data altogether. If less than 10% of the data was missing, then we examined if the prices for the day before and the day after were the same. If they were the same, then the software agent automatically filled in for the missing data with that price. Otherwise, the agent filled in for the missing data with the price for the day after. While we recognize that this is an arbitrary procedure, there are only 0.075% missing prices in the entire dataset, and thus it is unlikely to affect our results significantly. 4 We selected these categories because they are the most popular categories on the Internet. In addition, the products in these categories are sold by a large number of stores. For example, in the digital cameras category, "Canon EOS Digital Rebel XT" is sold by 63 stores. The selection of products was random. For example, in the category of DVDs, we chose products from multiple sub-categories (e.g., action, drama, comedy, children, etc.) . Similarly, in the music CDs category, we chose from many different sub-categories (e.g., blues, jazz, country, heavy metal, etc.). However, in some categories (e.g., notebook PCs, hard drives, PDAs), we included all the products available. In other categories (e.g., DVD players, digital cameras, PC monitors, software, video games), we randomly chose products from all sub-categories. For example, in DVD players, we chose half of the products from standard DVD players while the other half came from the more expensive DVD/VCR combo players. In digital cameras and camcorders, we chose half from regular digital cameras while the other half came from digital camcorders. In PC monitors, we chose half from CRT and flat CRT models, and the other half from LCD and TFT. In the software category, we chose products from multiple genres of software (e.g., educational software, operating systems, programming software, utility software, etc.). Similarly, in video games, we included multiple genres (adventure, action, sports, etc.). See Figures R8a-R8i in the appendix for sample price series. the overwhelming majority of the prices in retail grocery stores are well below $10.00. 5 In the Internet data, the prices range from $5.49 to $6,478.00, with the average prices in different categories spanning $12.90 to $1,694.58. Given the wider price range of the Internet data, therefore, we focus on 9¢ and 99¢ price-endings, as well as on other 9-ending prices in both the cents and the dollars digits, including $9, $9.99, $99, and $99.99.
In Figure 1 , we report the frequency distribution of the last digit for the entire Dominick's dataset. If a digit's appearance as a price-ending was random, then with ten possible endings, we should see 10% of the prices ending with each. As the figure indicates, however, about 65% of the prices end with 9. The next most popular price-ending is 5, accounting for about 11% of all price endings. Only a small proportion of the prices end with the other digits. The pattern is very similar at the category level, with 9 as the most popular price-ending for all categories except cigarettes.
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Next, we consider the frequency distribution of the last two digits. With two digits, there are 100 possible endings, 00¢, 01¢, …, 98¢, and 99¢. Thus, with a random distribution, the probability of each ending is only 1%. According to Figure 2 , however, most prices end with either 09¢, 19¢, …, or 99¢. This is not surprising since 9 is the dominant single-digit ending.
But of these, more than 15% of the prices end with 99¢. In contrast, only 4% to 6% of the prices end with 09¢, 19¢, …, and 89¢, each. We found a similar pattern for individual categories.
8 Figure 3 displays the frequency distribution of the last digit in the Internet data. 9 is the most popular terminal digit (33.4%), followed by 0 (24.1%), and 5 (17.4%). The frequency distribution of the last two digits exhibits a similar pattern, with 99¢ as the most popular priceending (26.7%), followed by 00¢ (20.3%), 95¢ (13.8%), and 98¢ (4.8%). See Figure 4 .
As mentioned above, the Internet dataset also includes some high-price product categories, which allows us to examine price-endings in dollar digits as well. In Figure 5 , we present the frequency distribution of the last dollar digit in the Internet data. According to the figure, 9 is the most popular ending for the dollar digit, with $9 price-endings over-represented 5 Indeed, according to Dutta, et al. (1999) and Levy, et al. (1997 Levy, et al. ( , 1998 , the average price of an item in large U.S. supermarket chains during 1991-92 was about $1.70. According to Bergen, et al. (2003) , the figure increased to $2.08 by 2001. 6 To save space, most of figures and tables on individual product categories are included in the appendix. We shall note that the results for individual product categories are similar to the aggregate results we report here. 7 The products in the Beer and Cigarettes categories in the Dominick's data are subject to various tax rules and other government regulations that could potentially skew the results. We, therefore, do not discuss their results.with 36.1%, followed by $4 price-endings with 9.9%, and $5 price-endings with 9.2%. A similar pattern emerges for the last two dollar digits as indicated by Figure 6 . Not surprisingly, the last two dollar digits of most prices contain 9, such as $99, $89, and $09. But more prices end with $99 than any other 9 price-endings. Moreover, almost 10% end with $99 among the 100 possible dollar endings (i.e., $0 through $99).
We also examined the frequency distribution of the last three digits of prices in the Internet data. 9 According to Table 3, $9.99 is the most popular ending for the last three digits (13.2%), followed by $9.00 (10.0%), and $9.95 (4.9%). 10 When we examine the last four digits of the prices (last column of Table   4 . However, average prices in these three product categories are far less than $100 (i.e., $13.46
for CDs, $27.43 for DVDs, and $30.83 for video games), and the maximum prices of CDs (i.e., $26.98) and video games (i.e., $57.99) are also well below $100. So, it isn't surprising that we do not see a lot of 9-endings for the dollar and ten-dollar digits in those product categories.
To summarize, in both datasets, 9 is the most popular terminal digit overall. But the popularity of 9 is not limited to the penny-digit. Rather, it is present in the dime, dollar, and tendollar digits too. The fact that our data include a variety of products with wide-ranging prices and different retail formats, further underscores the use of 9 as a terminal digit in our datasets.
IV. Frequency Distribution of Price Changes by Size
Having documented the dominance of 9 as the terminal digit in both datasets, we next 7 focus on the relationship between 9-ending and price rigidity. As Kashyap (1995) points out, the frequency distributions of price points will be of particular interest to macroeconomists and monetary economists if they have dynamic consequences. Our goal is to assess to what extent the specific price point, 9, that we have identified in our two datasets may be contributing to the retail price rigidity.
We begin by considering the distribution of price changes in Dominick's data. Figure 7 displays the frequency distribution of price changes in cents. Although the actual price changes occasionally go over $1.00, there are few. We, therefore, limit the analysis to price changes of up to $1.00. According to the figure, price changes that are multiples of dimes are most common. In fact, over 35% of the price changes are multiples of 10 cents.
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In the Internet data, the observed price range is much wider and consequently we observe a much wider range for price changes as well. The price changes vary in magnitude from 1¢ to $1,568, but the most common changes are in multiples of dollars-and consequently, in multiples of dimes. As shown in Table 5 , among the top ten most common changes in this dataset, eight are multiples of dollars, and nine are multiples of dimes. The only exception is 1¢ which ranks 10 th . Thus, similar to Dominick's dataset, the sizes of Internet price changes are such that they preserve the 9-endings.
Because of the wider range of price changes found in the Internet data, the ten most common price changes account for less than 30% of all price changes. To identify the prevalence of price changes in multiples of dimes, dollars, and tens of dollars, we categorize price changes based on how many digits in a price are affected by a price change (i.e., whether it affects the penny digit only, the penny and dime digits, or the penny, dime and dollar digits, etc.). For example, if we focus on price changes affecting the penny digit only, we can group all possible price changes into ten categories: those that change a price by 0¢, 1¢, …, 9¢. In the first group will be price changes in multiples of dimes (excluding 0¢ where a price does not change);
in the second group, 1¢, 11¢, …, 91¢, $1.01, …., etc. Similarly, we can group price changes into 100 groups based on how they affect the penny and the dime digits, one of which will be the category into which all price changes in multiples of dollars fall (again, excluding 0¢ where price does not change). Finally, we can group price changes into 1,000 groups based on how they 8 affect the penny, dime and dollar-digits, one of which will be the category into which all price changes in tens of dollars fall (again excluding 0¢, where price does not change).
When we categorize price changes in this manner, we find that price changes in multiples of dimes are the most frequent among the ten possible changes to the penny digit, accounting for 55.12% of all price changes. In addition, we find that among the 100 possible changes to the penny and dime digits, the most popular ones are multiples of dollars, which account for more than 42.86% of all changes. Finally, among the 1,000 possible changes to the last three digits, multiples of ten dollars are the most common, accounting for 9.60% of all changes. Similar results are obtained for individual product categories. Changes in multiples of dimes and in multiples of dollars are the most common for all ten product categories in our dataset. Changes in multiples of ten dollars are the most common for seven product categories (hard drives, software, PDAs, DVD players, PC monitors, digital cameras, and notebook PCs).
14 Based on the above results, we conclude that when prices change, they most often change in multiples of dimes, multiples of dollars, or even in tens of dollars. Consequently, the terminal digits are kept at 9 even after a price change. This indicates that terminal prices are "stuck" at 9.
V. The Effect of Price Points on Price Rigidity
To explore the contribution of 9-ending prices to price rigidity, we use a binomial logit model to estimate the price change probabilities. A logit model maintains logical consistency with the estimation of a 0/1 dependent variable, and provides an effective means to gauge the marginal effects via the odds ratio (Agresti, 2002 , Greene, 2003 , Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000 .
The model which we estimate using the method of maximum likelihood is given by
where q is the probability of a price change, D 9-Ending is a 9-Ending dummy variable which equals 1 if the price ends with 9 (i.e., 9¢-Ending or 99¢-Ending) and 0 otherwise, and D Sale is a Sale dummy variable which equals 1 if the product is on sale in a given week and 0 otherwise. The regression equation includes the Sale dummy because, according to Schindler (2003) and Anderson and Simester (2003) , prices ending with 9 may be related to sales, and sale prices are 9 more likely to change than regular prices. When we examine the 99¢-ending prices, we obtain the same pattern of results.
Specifically, the coefficient estimate on the 99¢-Ending dummy is negative and significant for all 27 product categories. See Table 6 . Therefore, the odds ratios are all smaller than 1 for the 99¢-Ending dummy. This indicates that prices that end with 99¢ are less likely to change. In fact, on average, prices that end with 99¢ are 24% less likely to change than prices that do not end with 99¢. Also, all product categories showed positive and significant coefficients on the Sale dummy, and sale prices are about 67 times more likely to change than regular prices.
Next, we estimate the same logit regression model for the Internet data, but now we use 9¢, 99¢, $9, $9.99, $99, and $99.99, in turn, as the independent variable. We did not include a
Sale dummy in these regressions as such information was not available in our data. The results of the logit regression for each independent variable are reported in Table 7 . Similar to what we found with Dominick's data, 9-ending prices are less likely to change than other prices. Overall, 9¢-ending prices are 31.90%, 99¢-ending prices 44.59%, $9-ending prices 45.89%, $99-ending prices 59.74%, $9.99-ending prices 58.90%, and $99.99-ending prices are 72.87%, less likely to change than other prices. We obtained similar results for each product category. Although music CDs and video games showed some unexpected results, in 95% of all possible cases for the category-level analysis, the effect of 9 price-endings on the probability of price changes is negative and significant. Thus, we find that prices tend to be "stuck" at 9-endings, making them more rigid: 9-ending prices are 24-73 percent less likely to change than non 9-ending prices.
VI. The Effect of Price Points on the Size of Price Change
If 9-ending prices are less likely to change in comparison to non 9-ending prices, then the average size of change of 9-ending prices should be larger when they do change, in comparison to non 9-ending prices. 16 This assumes that the cost of a price change, i.e., the menu cost, is the same regardless of the price ending, which is indeed the case according to the menu cost estimates of Levy, et al. (1997 and and Dutta, et al. (1999) for large US supermarket and drugstore chains, respectively.
In Tables 8 and 9 , we report the average size of price changes for 9¢-ending and non 9¢-ending prices, and for 99¢ and non 99¢-ending prices, respectively, in the Dominick's data.
According to Table 8 , in 23 of the 27 categories, the average change is indeed higher for 9¢-ending prices. The exceptions are the categories of frozen dinners, frozen entrees, and frozen juices (perhaps because they have short expiration periods), and front-end candies. The average price change is 47¢ if the price ends with 9¢, in contrast to 37¢ change when it does not end with 9¢, i.e., 27 percent difference.
The findings obtained for the 99¢-ending prices are even stronger. According to Table 9, in 26 of the 27 categories (frozen entrees being the only exception), the average change is higher for 99¢-ending prices. The differences for individual categories are also bigger here in comparison to Table 8 . The average price change is 57¢ if the price ends with 99¢, in contrast to 42¢ change when it does not end with 99¢, i.e., 35 percent difference.
In Tables 10-15 we report the findings for the internet data. Because of the wider price range, we consider here price endings with 9¢, 99¢, $9, $9.99, $99, and $99.99, as before. The results are as follows. For 9¢-ending prices (Table 10 ): in 8 out of the 10 categories (the exceptions being PDAs and Notebooks PCs), the average size of the price change is higher by about 12 percent if the price ends with 9¢ in comparison to non 9¢ ending prices. For 99¢-ending prices (Table 11 ): in 9 out of the 10 categories (the exception being PDAs), the average size of the price change is higher by about 29 percent if the price ends with 99¢ in comparison to non 16 We are grateful to Bob Barsky for suggesting this analysis. 99¢-ending prices. For $9-ending prices (Table 12 ): in 9 out of the 10 categories (the exception being Music CDs), the average size of the price change is higher by about 97 percent if the price ends with $9 in comparison to non $9-ending prices. For $9.99-ending prices (Table   13 ): in all 10 categories, the average size of the price change is higher by about 53 percent if the price ends with $9.99 in comparison to non $9.99-ending prices. For $99-ending prices (Table   14) Thus, the results are very robust in the internet data as well: in 52 of the 56 cases, the average size of the price change is higher if the price ends with a 9-ending price point. Moreover, in many individual cases the price differences are quite substantial. For example, for 9¢ price endings, the average price changes of the 9¢-ending and non 9¢-ending prices are $1.30 and $1.01, respectively, a difference of about 30 percent. In some cases, the differences are even larger. These findings are consistent with our predictions: because 9-ending prices are less likely to change, the average size of change of 9-ending prices are systematically larger when they do change, in comparison to non 9-ending prices. These findings, therefore, further underscore the extent of the retail price rigidity that is created by 9-ending price points.
VII. Making Sense of Ignoring Cents -Rational Inattention
Having documented overwhelming popularity of 9-ending price points in our two datasets, and having demonstrated that the price points lead to a substantial degree of price rigidity, we next want to try and explain these findings. As Kashyap (1995) notes, the existing literature does not offer a "tight" theoretical explanation for the popularity of price points and for its link to price rigidity. We try to fill this gap in the literature by offering a behavioral explanation which builds on the emerging literature on rational inattention.
We suspect that the frequent use of 9-ending price points and their link to price rigidity may be an outcome of firms' optimal reaction to consumers' rational inattention to the rightmost digits of prices. The need for rational inattention by consumers arises for at least two reasons.
First, consumers face huge amounts of information, which is costly to gather, absorb, and process. Second, they have time, resource, and cognitive information processing-capacity constraints. 17 In Sims' (1998, pp. 320-321) words, "Because individuals have many things to think about and limited time, they can devote only limited intellectual resources to… datagathering and analysis. We know from personal experience that many data that we could look up daily, and that are in principle relevant to our optimal economic decision-making, do not in fact influence our behavior, except when they change dramatically, or perhaps when we occasionally set aside some time to re-assess our portfolio."
Consumers with limited time and cognitive information processing-capacity constraints, who face complex environments and who need to assess and compare the prices of dozens and sometimes hundreds of products, will likely use time-saving devices such as rules-of-thumb, as suggested by Kashyap (1995) . In particular, time-pressed consumers might rationally choose to ignore some price information. 18 Specifically, we argue that the benefit of paying attention to each additional digit of a price declines as we move from left to right. Since people process multi-digit numeric information, including prices, from left-to-right (Schindler and Kirby, 1997; Hinrichs, et al. 1982; Poltrock and Schwartz, 1984; and Lambert, 1975) , the effort needed to recognize, process, and recall numeric information increases as the number of digits increases.
Thus, the marginal cost of processing each additional digit increases. Because the marginal benefit of the last digit is the lowest but its marginal cost is the highest, it will be least valuable among all digits. The last digit, thus, will offer the consumer the lowest net marginal value giving him incentive to ignore it. 19 A price-setter that knows that her customers ignore the last digit will have incentive to make it as high as possible, setting it to 9. Rational consumers expect this and thus 9-ending will be an equilibrium outcome (Basu, 1997) . This is illustrated in Figure 9 . Under rational inattention, there will be a range of inattention along the demand curve. In this price range, say ±10¢, consumers are inattentive and thus they do not respond to price changes. The optimal pricing strategy in this case will be to set 17 These time, resource, and information processing-capacity constraints have been explored by many authors in economics and marketing, under the labels of thinking costs (Shugan 1980) , reoptimization costs (Roufalgas 1994), information processing costs (Sims 1998) , information gathering costs (Ball and Mankiw 1994; Ball 2000; Zbaracki et al. 2004) , decision-making costs that result from either costs of acquiring information or costs of reoptimization (Mankiw and Reis 2002; Ball et al. 2005; Reis 2004 and Zbaracki et al. 2004 ), or limited channel capacity for absorbing information (Woodford 2001; Adam 2004; Sims 1998 Sims , 2003 . See also, Akerlof et al. (2000) , Ameriks et al. (2003 Ameriks et al. ( , 2004 , Gabaix et al. (2005) , and Rotemberg (2003 Rotemberg ( , 2005 . 18 This is consistent with the recent laboratory experiment findings that people tend to drop the rightmost digit in processing price information (Schindler and Bizer, 2005) .This kind of selective consumer inattention to price information is consistent with evidence from surveys of consumer behavior in this industry. See, Progressive Grocer, November 1974, p. 39; Progressive Grocer, February 1964, pp. C104-C106; and Gabor and Granger (1961) . This behavior is consistent also with the marketing literature in consumer behavior on "just noticeable differences" (Monroe, 1970 and , where consumers do not react to small changes in prices because they do not "notice" these changes, as documented by Kalyanaram and Little (1994) for sweetened and unsweetened drinks. 19 As Julio Rotemberg has noted, our argument holds even if the marginal cost remains constant.
13 the price at the highest point in the vertical segment of the demand curve, which will be 9. 20 Consumers' incentive to be attentive increases and therefore the optimality of 9 decreases as we move from the rightmost digits to the left. This implies that for the rightmost two digits we should still see more 99¢ endings than 89¢, 79¢, …, 09¢ endings. But the dominance of 99¢ over 89¢, 79¢, etc. should be weaker than the dominance of 9¢ over 8¢, 7¢, and so on. This process will continue towards the dollar-digit as well as the ten-dollar digit. Indeed, this is what we observe in both Dominick's data (65% for 9¢ vs. 15% for 99¢) and our Internet data (31.9% for 9¢, 26.3% for 99¢, 13.5% for $9.99, and 3.9% for $99.99). Now consider the implications of rational inattention for price rigidity. Rational inattention suggests that there will be a discontinuity in price adjustment within the range of rational inattention. When changes in market conditions are not large enough to warrant a price change larger than the range of inattention based on the ignored digit, firms might rationally choose not to respond. For example, when the price-setter is facing a price change decision that requires a price increase from $1.79 to $1.80, the increase will not be optimal if the customers ignore the last digit and perceive the change to be bigger (i.e., as a 10¢ increase) than it actually is. Similarly, a price decrease from $1.79 to $1.78 will have no effect on the quantity demanded if consumers ignore the last digit. 9¢-ending prices will, therefore, lead to price rigidity.
However, when a price change is justified, then the price-setter will have incentive to make price changes in multiples of 10¢. For example, a firm that faces a series of 1¢ cost increases may not change its price for many periods, but when the firm does react, it may increase the price by 10¢, even though the cost increase in that particular period was only 1¢.
The implication is that the store could change the price from $1.79 to $1.89, instead of to $1.80, without any additional cost, but with much higher benefit. That would be true even in a world with costs of price adjustment (Mankiw 1985) because of the largely fixed nature of such costs in the U.S. retail industry (Levy et al. 1997 (Levy et al. , 1998 Dutta et al. 1999 ). The empirical findings we reported in section IV are indeed consistent with these predictions.
VIII. Discussion and Conclusion
The issue of price rigidity lies at the heart of New Keynesian macroeconomics (Blinder et al. 1998 ) and industrial organization (Carlton 1986 ). However, the sources of nominal price rigidity are not well understood. In this study, we explore one possible theory-price point theory-which has been offered as a potential source of price rigidity (Kashyap, 1995) . Taken as a whole, our results suggest that price points, and their contribution to retail price rigidity, may be of substantial practical and economic importance. We structure the remaining discussion around how these results relate the existing literature on price rigidity, price points, theoretical explanations for these findings, and related macroeconomic issues.
Price Points and Price Rigidity
The strongest results emerging from our analysis are that once the terminal digits of a price are set at 9, the price is at least 24% (and as much as 73%) less likely to change compared to when the terminal digits are not 9. Further, when the prices change, they tend to change in multiples of dimes and dollars, which preserve the terminal digits at 9. Also, when a price changes, the change is larger for a 9-ending price than non 9-ending price. Thus, in both datasets, for almost all product categories, 9-ending price points seem to form substantial barriers to retail price changes. While our analysis of the Dominick's data is limited to the 9¢ and 99¢ price-endings and small price changes (in multiples of dimes), the wider price range in our Internet dataset allowed us to examine 9-endings and price rigidity for the dollar and ten-dollar digits as well as the last three and four digits. Our findings on 9-ending price points and price rigidity appear to be quite robust, occurring across two different datasets, with a wide range of prices, products, retail formats, retailers and even time periods.
These results are consistent with the importance practitioners seem to place on price points in their pricing decisions, from the 88% of managers mentioning this in Blinder, et al.'s 1998 study, or the survey studies of the European Central Bank's IPN summarized in Fabiani, et al. (2004) . Our results take these concerns one step further, showing that practitioner actions are consistent with these considerations, at least for the products we study. As such, we offer substantial support for price point theories of price rigidity, as suggested by Blinder, et al. (1998) and Kashyap (1995) , as viable and promising directions for future research in this area.
To our knowledge, this is the first study that directly examines the effect of retail price points on price rigidity across such a broad range of product categories, price levels, and retailers, in tradition retailing and Internet-based selling formats, using actual individual product level transaction price data from the US. Yet more work needs to be done to study this phenomenon across additional product categories, industries, retail formats, and countries. These additional studies can help document the generalizability of these results, and uncover the boundaries of this reasoning. In fact, emerging work from EU countries seems to indicate that prices set at price points tend to be more rigid in their contexts as well (e.g., Álvarez and Hernando, 2004 , Aucremanne and Dhyne, 2005 , and Baumgartner, et al. 2005 ).
Our results also suggest that the Internet, and techniques being developed in the Information Sciences (IS) discipline, offer many opportunities to improve our understanding of price setting, price points and price rigidity. The Internet provides a unique technological context for the micro-level study of price setting behavior and strategies (Bergen, et al., 2005) .
The ability to access transaction data using software agents being developed by IS scholars allows us to explore pricing and price adjustment patterns at lower costs, with fewer strict assumptions, and more realism at a previously unimaginable level of microeconomic detail. It 
Price Points
In our supermarket and Internet datasets, 9 is the most popular terminal digit overall and the use of 9-ending prices seems to be a significant retail pricing phenomenon. Our results are consistent with the findings reported by Friedman (1967) that 5 and 9-ending prices are particularly popular in the U.S. retail food industry. He refers to these two digits as "magic numbers." Combined, they account for more than 80% of all price-endings in his retail price data. Friedman reports that 3 and 7-ending prices are next in popularity. These findings are in line with ours. We also find that 9-endings are the single most popular ending, followed by 5, 3 and 7-endings. Unlike Friedman, however, we find that in our data a small proportion of prices end with 0 as well. See Figures 1 and 5 . This is not to suggest that 9 price endings are the only price point worth studying. The existing empirical evidence suggests that price points may vary across countries or industries.
For example, Ratfai (2003) reports that over 45% of the Hungarian retail prices in his data end with 0, and less than 20% of the prices end with 9. Similarly, Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2003, 2004 ) note that 9-ending prices are particularly popular in the U.S., Canada, Germany, and Belgium, but, they are scarce in Spain, Italy, Poland, and Hungary, where round prices are more common. Fengler and Winter (2001) report similar results for German data, and Mostacci and Sabbatini (2003) for Italian data. In contrast, in Asian countries including Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan and China, Heeler and Nguyen (2001) find an unusual over-representation of 8-endings. 21 These and other pricing practices, and their economic significance, need to be explored further.
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Making Sense of Ignoring Cents
The phenomenon of 9-ending prices has received considerable attention in the marketing literature, where most studies explain the 9-ending pricing phenomena on psychological grounds. 23 For example, according to Nagle and Holden (1995, p. 300) , buyers perceive the 9-ending prices (which Nagle and Holden term "odd-number pricing") "… as significantly lower than the slightly higher round numbers that they approximate." They suggest that consumers may have learned to associate odd-ending prices with discount prices, and therefore, the 9-ending prices draw their attention.
As another example, Schindler and Kirby (1997) propose two models to explain the popularity of 9-ending prices. Their first model, based on Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory, posits that consumers perceive a 9-ending price as a round-number price with a small amount given back, and that due to the prospect theory's nonlinear value function, they perceive the 9-ending price to be more attractive than the round-price. In their second model, consumers underestimate a 9-ending price by encoding it as the first round number that comes to mind when they see the number 9 during left-to-right processing. Their data on retail advertising price lends support to their second model. 24 21 According to Heeler and Nguyen (2001) , in the Chinese mind, numbers have special significance and symbolism. Even the sounds of the numbers can suggest good or bad luck. For example, number 8 represents luck to the Cantonese Chinese because in Cantonese it sounds like multiply or get rich (Fa in Cantonese). In Japan, 8 also has great symbolic significance because the Japanese writing of the number 8 looks like the shape of a mountain (suehirogari in Japanese), and thus the number 8 signifies grow or prosper. Consistent with this interpretation, Heeler and Nguyen (2001) find that close to 50% of restaurant menu prices sampled in Hong Kong had 8-endings, which they define as "happy endings." Consistent with the above is also a recent Time Magazine article by Rawe (2004) , in which she reports that at the casino of a recently built $240 million hotel Sands Macao in Macao (a former Portuguese colony handed over to China in 1999), the slot machines' winning trios of 7's have been replaced with trios of 8's. It turns out that the cultural importance of some roman numerals is not limited to "happy endings." For example, according to Mirhadi (2000) , when the Masquerade tower was added to Hotel Rio in Las Vegas in 1997, the hotel architects decided to skip the 40 th -49 th floors because the Arabic numeral "4" in Chinese sounds similar to the word "death." Instead, they went directly from the 39 th floor to the 50 th floor. 22 Additional analyses (not reported here to save space) show that 9 is indeed more rigid than any other digit in our datasets. Other popular digits in our data (e.g., 5), do not consistently lead to more price rigidity, and even when they do the rigidity associated with those digits is considerably less compared to that associated with 9. 23 See Shapiro (1968) and Monroe (1990) for reviews of earlier literature, and Anderson and Simester (2003) for a review of more recent literature in marketing. 24 Other theories try to explain 9-ending pricing based on image effect or level effect. Still other theories argue that sellers like to give change or that buyers like to receive a change. It has been suggested also that 9-ending prices may be interpreted as discount prices and thus are indicative of good bargains. Finally some authors have suggested a cognitive accessibility of certain numbers to explain pricing points, especially pricing with numbers that end with either 0 or 5. See Shy (2000) and Ruffle and Shtudiner (2006) for a critical review of some of these theories. All these explanations, however, assume some form of irrational behavior, as Shy (2000) argues. Could it be that 9-ending prices have a more rational explanation, as Landsburg's opening quote in this paper suggests?
25 Our rational inattention-based explanation differs from most of the studies in marketing and economics on 9-endings (e.g., Nagle and Holden 1995 and Schindler and Kirby 1997) in that it does not assume these kinds of irrational behavior.
We suggest that consumers' rational inattention and firms' reactions to it, can offer a plausible explanation for our findings. So, not only do we document the various phenomena that we study thoroughly, we also bring a fresh theoretical perspective to bear on this problem. The existing studies that have employed the idea of rational inattention (see footnote 17), all focus on various macroeconomic issues, such as monetary policy, inflation dynamics, consumption dynamics, etc. As far as we know, this is the first paper to extent the ideas of rational inattention to the study of individual price dynamics.
Clearly, our main empirical findings-that price points are more rigid, and that price changes are such that they preserve these price points-hold regardless of what theory is used to explain the use of price points. Thus, as long as price points have a behavioral or economic reason to exist, firms will use them to leverage that reason in their price adjustment decisions.
Implications for Macroeconomics Research
Although the data we use, the empirical findings we report, and the explanation we offer, are of a microeconomic nature, these ideas may have potential implications for broader macroeconomic and policy issues. In macroeconomics, we typically do not consider nominal magnitudes to be as important as real magnitudes for optimal decision-making. Yet, our results imply decision rules by customers and firms that may affect both price points and price adjustments. In such situations, the nominal magnitude of numeric information attached to economic quantities may matter.
There are a variety of macroeconomic settings where these insights on price points, price rigidity and rational inattention might be relevant. For example, dropping the smallest currency unit has been a recent topic of debate in the United States and Europe. 26 The smallest currency 25 Landsburg (1995) offers an interesting historical account of 9-ending prices. See also Ginzberg (1936) for a social customs theory, and more recent authors, such as Basu (1997 Basu ( , 2005 , Shy (2000) , Ruffle and Shtudiner (2006) and Andersen and Simester (2003) , for economic explanations for 9-ending prices. 26 According to a July 19, 2001 report of Larry Copeland of the USA Today, "France, Spain and Britain, quit producing low-denomination coins in recent decades because production costs kept going up while the coins' purchasing power went down." More recently, it has been reported that in many European Union Countries that have adopted the Euro, the public-buyers as well as sellers-seems to exhibit resistance to the use of 1-cent and 2-cent denomination coins because of the inconvenience their use entails: "They're small, nearly valueless-and a nuisance to millions of Europeans. The tiny denomination 1-and 2-cent Euro coins are annoying shoppers and unit defines the minimum regions of price points and price ranges of customer inattention.
This appears to be true in the case of products that are sold through automated devices such as soda and candy bar vending machines, parking meters, coin-operated laundry machines, etc.
27
As another example, the common use of 9-endings, and more generally the popularity of price points have recently received a considerable attention in public discussions in several EU countries in the context of the conversion of prices from local currencies to the Euro. The concern was about the possibility that retailers may have acted opportunistically by rounding their prices upward after conversion to the Euro in their attempt to preserve the pricing points.
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The idea of rational inattention and our findings reported here along with the findings reported by Levy, et al. (2005) about the presence of asymmetry in "small" price adjustments in various datasets suggests that more research is needed on these and other related issues.
disrupting business from Paris to Milan," (Eric Pfanner, "Euro quandary: It's no small change," International Herald Tribune, Tel-Aviv Edition, Friday, March 22, 2002, p. 1) . The argument here seems to resemble the arguments made in the context of the "1¢ nuisance" cost caused by the need to obtain one-cent stamp to be added to the standard first class mail stamp after each upward adjustment in the price of the US first class mail by 1¢ (Rubin 1999) . In July 2001, Rep. Jim Kolbe (R-Arizona) has introduced the "Legal Tender Modernization Act," which would make the US penny obsolete. According to the proposed bill, checks would still be made to the exact amount, but the merchants would be required to round up or down to the nearest nickel on cash purchases. Levy and Young (2004) , Bils and Klenow (2004), and Campbell and Eden (2005) . 28 See, for example, Folkertsma (2002), Folkertsma, et al. (2002) , Ehrmann (2005) , and the studies cited therein. $7.00 1.47% Note: The rightmost column shows the results after three product categories (CDs, DVDs, and video games) are left out. Bold-marked prices in the first three rows indicate that they are in the top three frequent price changes in each category. (or D 99 ) is 9-ending dummy variable, which equals 1 if the price ends with 9 (or 99) and 0 otherwise. D Sale is a sale dummy, which equals 1 if the product is on sale in the given week and 0 otherwise. All p-values are less than 0.0001. The average odds ratios (O/R) reported in the last row of the table are the simple averages of the odds ratios for each product category. Table 7 
